References
Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The market for
“lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market
mechanism*. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3),
488–500. https://doi.org/10.2307/1879431
Allais, M. (1953). Le comportement de l’homme rationnel devant le
risque: Critique des postulats et axiomes de l’ecole americaine.
Econometrica, 21(4), 503–546. https://doi.org/10.2307/1907921
Andreoni, J., and Bernheim, B. D. (2009). Social Image and the
5050 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of
Audience Effects. Econometrica, 77(5), 1607–1636. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA7384
Ashraf, N., Karlan, D., and Yin, W. (2006). Tying odysseus to the mast:
Evidence from a commitment savings product in the philippines*. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(2), 635–672. https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2006.121.2.635
Ayton, P., and Fischer, I. (2004). The hot hand fallacy and the
gambler’s fallacy: Two faces of subjective randomness?
Memory & Cognition, 32(8), 1369–1378. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03206327
Barber, B. M., and Odean, T. (2001). Boys will be boys: Gender,
overconfidence, and common stock investment*. The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 116(1), 261–292. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355301556400
Barberis, N., Huang, M., and Thaler, R. H. (2006). Individual
Preferences, Monetary Gambles, and Stock Market Participation: A Case
for Narrow Framing. American Economic Review, 96(4),
1069–1090. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.4.1069
Bar-Eli, M., Avugos, S., and Raab, M. (2006). Twenty years of
“hot hand” research: Review and critique.
Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 7(6), 525–553. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychsport.2006.03.001
Bazerman, M. H., and Moore, D. A. (2013). Judgment in managerial
decision making (8. ed). Wiley.
Beshears, J., Choi, J. J., Harris, C., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. C., and
Sakong, J. (2020). Which early withdrawal penalty attracts the most
deposits to a commitment savings account? Journal of Public
Economics, 183, 104144. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104144
Camerer, C., Babcock, L., Loewenstein, G., and Thaler, R. (1997). Labor
supply of new york city cabdrivers: One day at a time*. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(2), 407–441. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355397555244
Camerer, C., and Lovallo, D. (1999). Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An
Experimental Approach. The American Economic Review,
89(1), 13.
Charness, G., and Rabin, M. (2002). Understanding social preferences
with simple tests. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
117(3), 817–869. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4132490
Cosmides, L., and Tooby, J. (1996). Are humans good intuitive
statisticians after all? Rethinking some conclusions from the literature
on judgment under uncertainty. Cognition, 58(1), 1–73.
https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(95)00664-8
Czerlinski, J., Gigerenzer, G., and Goldstein, D. G. (1999). How good
are simple heuristics. In G. Gigerenzer, P. Todd, and The ABC Research
Group (Eds.), Simple heuristics that make us smart. Oxford
University Press.
Davidson, D., McKinsey, J. C. C., and Suppes, P. (1955). Outlines of a
Formal Theory of Value, I. Philosophy of Science,
22(2), 140–160. https://doi.org/10.1086/287412
De Bondt, W. F. M., and Thaler, R. H. (1995). Chapter 13 Financial
decision-making in markets and firms: A behavioral perspective. In R. A.
Jarrow, V. Maksimovic, and W. T. Ziemba (Eds.), Handbooks in
Operations Research and Management Science (Vol. 9, pp. 385–410).
Elsevier. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092705070580057X
Engel, C. (2011). Dictator games: a meta study. Experimental
Economics, 14(4), 583–610. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-011-9283-7
Farber, H. S. (2005). Is tomorrow another day? The labor supply of new
york city cabdrivers. Journal of Political Economy,
113(1), 46–82. https://doi.org/10.1086/426040
Farber, H. S. (2008). Reference-Dependent Preferences and Labor Supply:
The Case of New York City Taxi Drivers. American Economic
Review, 98(3), 1069–1082. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.3.1069
Farber, H. S. (2015). Why you can’t find a taxi in the rain
and other labor supply lessons from cab drivers. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 130(4), 1975–2026. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv026
Fehr, E., and Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition,
and cooperation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
114(3), 817–868. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2586885
Frederick, S., Loewenstein, G., and O’Donoghue, T. (2002). Time
discounting and time preference: A critical review. Journal of
Economic Literature, 40(2), 351–401. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2698382
Genesove, D., and Mayer, C. (2001). Loss aversion and seller behavior:
Evidence from the housing market. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 116(4), 1233–1260. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2696458
Gigerenzer, G. (2011). What are natural frequencies? BMJ,
343, d6386. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.d6386
Gigerenzer, G. (2021). Embodied heuristics. Frontiers in
Psychology, 12. https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.711289
Gilovich, T., Vallone, R., and Tversky, A. (1985). The hot hand in
basketball: On the misperception of random sequences. Cognitive
Psychology, 17(3), 295–314. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(85)90010-6
Giné, X., Karlan, D., and Zinman, J. (2010). Put Your Money Where Your
Butt Is: A Commitment Contract for Smoking Cessation. American
Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2(4), 213–235. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.2.4.213
Green, L., Fristoe, N., and Myerson, J. (1994). Temporal discounting and
preference reversals in choice between delayed outcomes. Psychonomic
Bulletin & Review, 1(3), 383–389. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03213979
Heath, C., Larrick, R. P., and Wu, G. (1999). Goals as Reference Points.
Cognitive Psychology, 38(1), 79–109. https://doi.org/10.1006/cogp.1998.0708
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H.,
and McElreath, R. (2001). In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral
Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies. American Economic
Review, 91(2), 73–78. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.2.73
Hertwig, R., and Gigerenzer, G. (1999). The ‘conjunction
fallacy’ revisited: how intelligent inferences look like
reasoning errors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making,
12(4), 275–305. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0771(199912)12:4<275::AID-BDM323>3.0.CO;2-M
Hoffrage, U., and Gigerenzer, G. (1998). Using natural frequencies to
improve diagnostic inferences. Academic Medicine,
73(5), 53840. https://doi.org/10.1097/00001888-199805000-00024
Hoffrage, U., Krauss, S., Martignon, L., and Gigerenzer, G. (2015).
Natural frequencies improve bayesian reasoning in simple and complex
inference tasks. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 1473. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01473
Johnson, E. J., and Goldstein, D. (2003). Do Defaults Save Lives?
Science, 302(5649), 1338–1339. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1091721
Johnson, N. D., and Mislin, A. A. (2011). Trust games: A meta-analysis.
Journal of Economic Psychology, 32(5), 865–889. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2011.05.007
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow (1st edition).
Farrar, Straus; Giroux.
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., and Thaler, R. H. (1991). Anomalies: The
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias. Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 5(1), 193–206. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.5.1.193
Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of
decision under risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263–291. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185
Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. (1984). Choices, values, and frames.
American Psychologist, 39(4), 341–350. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.39.4.341
Keynes, J. M. (1936). The general theory of employment, interest,
and money. Macmillan. http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks03/0300071h/printall.html
Kirby, K. N., and Herrnstein, R. J. (1995). Preference Reversals Due to
Myopic Discounting of Delayed Reward. Psychological Science,
6(2), 83–89. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.1995.tb00311.x
Kirgios, E. L., Mandel, G. H., Park, Y., Milkman, K. L., Gromet, D. M.,
Kay, J. S., and Duckworth, A. L. (2020). Teaching temptation bundling to
boost exercise: A field experiment. Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes, 161, 20–35. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2020.09.003
Kőszegi, B., and Rabin, M. (2006). A model of reference-dependent
preferences. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
121(4), 1133–1165. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25098823
Martin, V. (2017). When to quit: Narrow bracketing and reference
dependence in taxi drivers. Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization, 144, 166–187. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.024
Miller, J. B., and Sanjurjo, A. (2018). Surprised by the Hot Hand
Fallacy? A Truth in the Law of Small Numbers. Econometrica,
86(6), 2019–2047. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA14943
Moore, D. A., Oesch, J. M., and Zietsma, C. (2007). What Competition?
Myopic Self-Focus in Market-Entry Decisions. Organization
Science, 18(3), 440–454. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1060.0243
Moulin, H. (1986). Game theory for social sciences. New York
Press.
Nagel, R. (1995). Unraveling in guessing games: An experimental study.
The American Economic Review, 85(5), 1313–1326. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2950991
Newton, E. L. (1990). The rocky road from actions to intentions
[PhD thesis]. https://www.proquest.com/openview/b740253d9b78599786f59d6b6055cc3b/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y
Page, L. (2022). Optimally Irrational: The Good Reasons We Behave
the Way We Do. Cambridge University Press. https://www.cambridge.org/au/academic/subjects/economics/microeconomics/optimally-irrational-good-reasons-we-behave-way-we-do,
https://www.cambridge.org/au/academic/subjects/economics/microeconomics
Prelec, D. (1998). The probability weighting function.
Econometrica, 66(3), 497–527. https://doi.org/10.2307/2998573
Rabin, M. (2000). Risk Aversion and Expected-Utility Theory: A
Calibration Theorem. Econometrica, 68(5), 1281–1292.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2999450
Rabin, M. (2002). Inference by believers in the law of small numbers.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(3), 775–816.
https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302760193896
Rabin, M., and Thaler, R. H. (2001). Anomalies: Risk Aversion.
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(1), 219–232. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.15.1.219
Rabin, M., and Vayanos, D. (2010). The gambler’s and hot-hand fallacies:
Theory and applications. The Review of Economic Studies,
77(2), 730–778. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00582.x
Rapoport, A., and Budescu, D. V. (1997). Randomization in individual
choice behavior. Psychological Review, 104, 603–617.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.104.3.603
Read, D., and Leeuwen, B. van. (1998). Predicting Hunger: The Effects of
Appetite and Delay on Choice. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 76(2), 189–205. https://doi.org/10.1006/obhd.1998.2803
Samuelson, W. F., and Bazerman, M. (1985). Negotiation under the
winner’s curse (V. Smith, Ed.). JAI Press.
Savant, M. vos. (1990). Game show problem. PARADE Magazine,
16. https://web.archive.org/web/20130121183432/http://marilynvossavant.com/game-show-problem/
Shefrin, H., and Statman, M. (1985). The Disposition to Sell Winners Too
Early and Ride Losers Too Long: Theory and Evidence. The Journal of
Finance, 40(3), 777–790. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb05002.x
Spiegelhalter, D., and Gage, J. (2015). What can education learn from
real-world communication of risk and uncertainty? The Mathematics
Enthusiast, 12(1), 4–10. https://doi.org/10.54870/1551-3440.1329
Thaler, R. (1980). Toward a positive theory of consumer choice.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1(1),
39–60. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(80)90051-7
Thaler, R. (1981). Some empirical evidence on dynamic inconsistency.
Economics Letters, 8(3), 201–207. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(81)90067-7
Thaler, Richard H., and Benartzi, S. (2004). Save More
Tomorrow: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee
Saving. Journal of Political Economy, 112(S1),
S164–S187. https://doi.org/10.1086/380085
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases. Science, 185(4157), 1124–1131.
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.185.4157.1124
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. (1982). Evidential impact of base rates.
In A. Tversky, D. Kahneman, and P. Slovic (Eds.), Judgment under
uncertainty: Heuristics and biases (pp. 153–160). Cambridge
University Press. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/judgment-under-uncertainty/evidential-impact-of-base-rates/CC35C9E390727085713C4E6D0D1D4633
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive
reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
Psychological Review, 90(4), 293–315. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.90.4.293
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory:
Cumulative representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and
Uncertainty, 5, 297–323. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00122574
Zelmer, J. (2003). Linear Public Goods Experiments: A Meta-Analysis.
Experimental Economics, 6(3), 299–310. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026277420119